News Corp board's defence of the indefensible


December 2, 2018

This is the full statement from the News Corp board defending Rupert Murdoch's gerrymander over News Corp and urging shareholders to vote against Stephen Mayne's shareholder resolution at the forthcoming annual meeting in New York on 19 October.

The Board's Statement in Opposition to Proposal No. 4

The Board recommends that stockholders vote against this Proposal No. 4. The elimination of the Company's dual class capital structure would effectively dilute the voting power of all the existing Class B stockholders. The Board believes that retaining two classes of common stock with different voting rights is in the best interest of the Company and its stockholders. The Board believes that the current dual class capitalization structure: (a) promotes stability and continuity in the leadership and management of the Company, which allows the Company to focus on long-term objectives, (b) enhances the Company's ability to attract, retain and motivate highly qualified key employees and (c) provides the Company with greater flexibility in financing its growth.

The Board's reasons for its position are described in more detail below.

Continuity and Stability

In the face of difficult challenges, management of companies with a single class of common stock can become singularly focused on maximizing short-term value and performance at the expense of long-range planning in an effort to justify its business plans. The Board believes that the Company's history of growth and financial strength is due in large part to the concentration of voting power in Mr. K.R. Murdoch, the Company's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and his family (the “Murdoch Family Interests”). Further, the Board believes that the Murdoch Family Interests have pursued stockholder value enhancing strategies throughout the Company's history and have been the primary source of the strategic vision that has made the Company's success up to this point possible. The Board has always been committed to the long-term viability of the Company. As such, the Board believes that the dual class capital structure, which provides limited voting rights for the Class A Common Stockholders on extraordinary matters, reduces the risk of disruption in the continuity of the Company's current operational policies and long-range strategy by allowing management to pursue strategies that they believe will enhance the long-term profitability of the Company.

Retention of Key Employees

The Board believes that the dual class capital structure enhances the Company's ability to attract and retain highly qualified key employees. The Company's ability to issue Class A Common Stock-based equity awards increases its flexibility in structuring compensation plans so that management and key employees can participate in the growth of the Company without diluting the voting power of the Class B stockholders.

Financing Flexibility

The dual class capital structure provides the Company with greater flexibility to pursue a long-term emphasis on stockholder value through growth and financial strength. The Board believes that the Company's ability to issue Class A Common Stock, for which there is already a sizeable and liquid market, better positions the Company to finance growth opportunities without significantly diluting the voting interest of the Company's Class B stockholders. The Board believes that a company with a single class of stock may run the risk of foregoing stock issuances (thereby foregoing strategic transactions that potentially could be of great benefit to stockholders) simply out of concerns over dilution of control. The Company, however, has historically issued its Class A Common Stock for a variety of corporate purposes that have enhanced the value and financial strength of the Company. Such transactions include the financing of significant mergers and acquisitions and the raising of needed capital to fund growth. As the issue of control is not a factor in the Board's consideration of these transactions, the decision by the Company to issue stock in acquisitions or capital raising transactions is based solely on the perceived economic benefits of the transaction to the Company and all of its stockholders.

Approval of this Proposal 4 would not itself eliminate the Company's dual class capital structure, but rather it would be an advisory recommendation to the Board to submit such a proposal to the Company's Class A and Class B stockholders within the next 12 months.

THE BOARD UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMENDS A VOTE “AGAINST” THIS STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE COMPANY'S DUAL CLASS CAPITAL STRUCTURE WHICH IS DESIGNATED AS PROPOSAL NO. 4 ON THE ENCLOSED PROXY CARD.